Schaeffer cites the Larousse definition of the word as referring to "un bruit que l'on entend sans voir les causes dont il provient" (Schaeffer 91) . He was picking up on a suggestion on the part of Jérôme Peignot in a 1960 essay in Esprit for a more appropriate name for "musique concrète." 7 The etymology of the term "acousmatique," both Peignot and Schaeffer remark, refers us to the disciples of Pythagoras who listened to his voice from behind a curtain, in silence, in order better to attend to his teaching. Contemporary telecommunications technology reproduces the conditions of this mythical and sacred tradition and "[restitue] à l'ouïe seule l'entière responsabilité d'une perception d'ordinaire appuyée sur d'autres témoignages sensibles" (Schaeffer 91 ). The acousmatic situation, for Schaeffer, places the focus squarely and solely on the act of listening and thus functions as a paradigmic shift in the analytic pursuit of the musical object as Schaeffer redefines it. The acousmatic field enables something like " [une] pure écoute" (Schaeffer 93) , which, without the usual recourse to the visual confirmation of the source or cause, makes possible the analysis of sonic objects as such: "elle impose […] l'objet sonore comme une perception digne d'être observée pour elle-même" (Schaeffer 94 ).
The epistemological gesture effected by Schaeffer here bears some similarity to what Barthes in Le degré zéro de l'écriture (1953) will call "l'engagement de la forme." 8 The literary object, Barthes proposes, emerges from the moment when the (classical) transparency of language is interrupted, such that "la Forme se suspend devant le regard comme un objet" (Degré zéro 9). Indeed one can encounter in Barthes's work variants of the acousmatic situation, such as the episode of the Tangiers boîte described in Le plaisir du texte (1973) where the writing subject, "à moitié endormi sur une banquette de bar," listens to the "stéreophonie" of voices and noises within his "écoute," finding it to be outside the sentence ("hors la phrase"). 9 Or again the situation of the subject in Japan, confronted by a language of which he can grasp "l'aération émotive […] la pure signifiance," without the alienation and normality implicit in "le sens plein." 10 However, at a fundamental level the direction of Schaeffer's enterprise diverges from that of Barthes, particularly as far as Barthes's consideration of the act of listening and its implications are concerned. The fact that, despite being near contemporaries, Barthes never (to my knowledge) refers to Schaeffer, nor does the term acousmatique occur in his work, suggests a fundamental divergence of concerns. This divergence, I would suggest, is already implicit in the distance between the original myth of the akousmatikoi and the use to which Schaeffer puts the term. As mentioned above, the curtain that hung between Pythagoras and the probationary Pythagoreans (the akous-matikoi were at a different level from the initiated mathematikoi, who had a fuller access to the teachings of their master) was designed to concentrate their attention on the teachings of the master through a sole attention to the voice, without recourse or access to the visual confirmation of the source. The scenario privileges the voice in a context of pedagogy, secrecy, and sacred authority, as the object of a hermeneutic attention and a relation of dependence, rather than as a purely sonorous object. It seems difficult here to separate the voice from a situation of demand, obligation, and desire. Insistence on the vocal elements of the original myth suggests that, instead of enabling a kind of formal, analytic attention to the sound, it proposes the voice as a crucial stage in the formation of the subject; the voice appears as a kind of transitional object between the (mute) subject and the figure whose task it is to initiate that subject into language and knowledge.
The power of the voice for Barthes is no doubt due to its early role in the forging of the relation between the body and language. In a 1977 article titled "Écoute," Barthes, despite the Schaefferian resonances of his title, focuses almost exclusively on the voice, underlining recurrently the notion of the voice as the index, in language, of the materiality of the body, or the voice as "l'articulation du corps et du discours." 11 He goes on to cite psychoanalyst Denis Vasse on the specificity of listening in the psychoanalytic session, which demands "une attention ouverte à l'entre-deux du corps et du discours" ("Écoute" 226). The psychoanalyst, Barthes suggests, has to learn the language of the unconscious of his patient, in the same way as the child, immersed in language, must learn how to speak, and learn its place in the symbolic order, through listening to the voices of others. The voice, and the act of listening to the voice, is thus a foundational event in the relation of the subject to language: "L'écoute est ce jeu d'attrape des signifiants par lequel l'infans devient être parlant" ("Écoute" 226-27). Distinct therefore from sound, what is at stake with the voice is the very nature of the bond between the body and language, wherein the singularity and the finitude of the body is in play. This emphasis on the status of the voice as juncture and division is well summarized by Kaja Silverman:
The voice is the site of perhaps the most radical of all subjective divisions-the division between meaning and materiality. As Denis Vasse observes, it is situated "in the partition of the organic and organization, in the partition between the biological body and the body of language, or, if one prefers, the social body." The sounds the voice makes always exceed signification to some degree, both before the entry into language and after. The voice is never completely standardized, forever retaining an individual flavor or texture-what Barthes calls its "grain." Because we hear before we can see, the voice is also closely identified with the infantile scene. On the other hand, because it is through the voice that the subject normally accedes to language, and therefore sacrifices its life, it is associated as well with phenomenal loss, the birth of desire, and the aspiration toward discursive mastery. 12 It may now be possible to situate Barthes further in relation to Schaeffer and to the acousmatic situation. If Schaeffer intends through his reference to the acousmatic to found and to legitimize an analytic attention to sound without recourse to its instrumental cause or source, for Barthes, in his consideration of voice, the sound cannot be dissociated from its cause or source in the body, whether present or absent. Barthes's attention to the "grain" of the voice (on which more later), while it dissociates the material, sonorous qualities of the voice from the communicable message or meaning of the statement, spoken or sung, corresponds to the acousmatic structure in this dissociation, but retains the recourse to the body as the cause and source of the voice. In effect, it is because of the persistence of the link to the body that the acousmatic situation-in which the vocal body cannot be seen-has a particularly powerful affective charge. To put it another way, it is because the voice necessarily bears witness to the presence of the body that the absence of the body opens up what we might call the uncanny and tragic dimensions of the acousmatic.
Barthes's proposition of the "grain" of the voice in the essay that bears that title in fact follows the trajectory of Schaeffer's Traité. Finding that music criticism is condemned to an adjectival and predicative relation to its object, Barthes proposes that the only way to exorcize ("exorciser") musical commentary is to change the object itself ("changer l'objet musical lui-même") through a modification of "son niveau de perception ou d'intellection." 13 In relation to a restricted portion of what counts (for him) as music-song-Barthes proposes something similar to Schaeffer's "écoute réduite" (Schaeffer 270-72), through the notion of the "grain" of the voice. The grain of the voice is something beyond, or before, the meaning of the words of the song; it is "la materialité du corps parlant sa langue maternelle" ("Grain" 238). The "grain" of the voice isolated, the kind of evaluation that now becomes possible will be without law or code ("sans loi"): "elle déjouera la loi de la culture mais aussi celle de l'anticulture; elle développera au-delà du sujet toute la valeur qui est cachée derrière 'j'aime' ou 'je n'aime pas'" ("Grain" 244). This evaluation will be "erotic," in the sense that it derives from a relation between individual bodies ("évaluation […] individuelle sans doute, puisque je suis decidé à écou-ter mon rapport au corps de celui ou de celle qui chante ou qui joue et que ce rapport est érotique" ["Grain" 243-44]). The knowledge it provides will not be cultural or scientific in the strict sense, but a knowledge provided by the erotic body, the body of jouissance. Barthes writes of his response to the performance of the Polish-French harpsichordist Wanda Landowska: "j'entends avec certitude-la certitude du corps, de la jouissance-que le clavecin de Wanda Landowska vient de son corps interne" ("Grain" 244). Barthes's displacement of the musical object towards the grain is thus oriented towards an erotic and amorous evaluation. Elsewhere Barthes will propose that "Tout rapport à une voix est forcément amoureux" ("Grain" 248).
It seems possible to propose two reasons why this should be the case, one that gives a weak emphasis to "amoureux," the other concerning a stronger sense of that word. The relation of love, in the weak sense, is one between two bodies in their singularity; it is bound to the voice insofar as it is in the voice, as we saw earlier, that the singular relation of this individual to language is knotted. The voice thus functions as the vector of the relation of love to the extent that it relates two bodies in their singularity, above and beyond their cultural capital on the one hand or their purely physical attributes on the other. In the stronger sense, the response and evaluation of the voice is necessarily amorous because the voice bears witness to "phenomenal loss," as Kaja Silverman remarks in the quotation given above (Silverman 44); I am in love with the body of the voice because the voice attests to its past, present or eventual loss, strictly speaking to its mortality, because it is the mark in the body of death.
The most acute manifestation of this, for Barthes, is the Romantic Lied (specifically the Lieder of Schubert and Schumann). In the essay "Le chant romantique" (1977), having distinguished in the Lied the possibility it affords of singing it 'in' yourself with your body ("c'est une musique qui n'a de sens que si je puis toujours la chanter en moi-même avec mon corps"), Barthes asks what or who it is in the (listening) body that sings the Lied.
14 His response foregrounds the desire for the lost object, or the fear of abandonment: "C'est tout ce qui retentit en moi, me fait peur ou me fait désir. Peu importe d'où vient cette blessure ou cette joie: pour l'amoureux, comme pour l'enfant, c'est toujours l'affect du sujet perdu, abandonné, que chante le chant romantique" ("Chant" 255). The audible affectivity of Romantic song "vient du corps séparé de l'enfant, de l'amoureux, du sujet perdu" (L'obvie 256). The voice here speaks (or sings) loss, speaks (or sings) of "l'absence irrémédiable de l'être aimé" ("Chant" 256).
To a certain extent, then, the voice is always potentially in an acousmatic situation; it is always in a sense the index of the absence of the other, but of an absence either really or potentially inflected by loss, that mode of absence that attests to a lost and desired presence. Of course, "ordinarily," to borrow Schaeffer's expression (Schaeffer 91), other senses may testify to the presence of the loved one and attenuate or dissipate entirely the tragic dimension in which the voice, as voice, operates. Michel Chion, who worked with Schaeffer, remarks in La voix au cinéma (1982) that in sound cinema so-called "synchronous" sounds are more often than not "swallowed" by the image sequence, put to the profit of the fiction or the film as a whole. 15 The visual confirmation of the presence of the other can accordingly rub or run over the tragic dimension of the voice and cause it to be forgotten as the mark of the mortality and loss-whether real, eventual or phantasmatic-of the other.
This dynamic-between image and voice-is explored in poignant detail by Marcel Proust in the episode of the grandmother's telephone call in Le côté de Guermantes (1920 Guermantes ( -1921 ; it is an episode that will provide Barthes with a further opportunity to meditate on the tragic dimension of the voice, and it approximates the acousmatic situation as Schaeffer describes it. I address it here so as to specify further the relation of the subject to the voice and thus to move further towards a sense of what Barthes is teaching us through his attention to the voice. The incidence of the (then) new technology of telecommunications provides Proust with an opportunity to write theoretically about the separation of the voice from the visually present body of the loved one and the changes in the nature of perception that this provokes, changes that bear an acute affective charge.
The narrator is in Doncières, and his friend Robert de Saint-Loup has arranged for his grandmother to call him on the telephone at the local post office at about a quarter to four. He writes:
Présence réelle que cette voix si proche-dans la séparation effective! Mais anticipation aussi d'une séparation éternelle! Bien souvent, écoutant de la sorte, sans voir celle qui me parlait de loin, il me semblait que cette voix clamait des profondeurs d'où l'on ne remonte pas, et j'ai connu l'anxiété qu'allait m'étreindre un jour, quand une voix reviendrait ainsi (seule, et ne tenant plus à un corps que je ne devais plus jamais revoir) murmurer à mon oreille des paroles que j'aurais voulu embrasser au passage sur des lèvres à jamais en poussière. 16 The qualifications of "real" and "close" mimic the operation of the telephone in drawing the voice to or into our attention, intensifying it, but there is already an intimation of the anxiety that will trouble the narrator in the dash that separates the first part of the opening sentence from the second; the amplification of the realness and proximity of the voice of the loved one is undercut by the dash that precedes the qualifying statement "dans la séparation effective." The dash functions as a hiatus, a blank space in thought and in grammatical sequence, and it effectively embodies the separation it introduces, as if the sentence were following the sequence of the narrator's emotive experience: the experience of proximity followed by the realization of absence. The dash embodies the contradictory simultaneity of presence and absence, and as such it remains properly unthinkable and unutterable in the text. It marks the rupture of voice and body, functioning to this extent as a second castration, a return or a reminder of the radical ("eternal") separation in which life has been sacrificed for language, Silverman's "phenomenal loss" (Silverman 44 ). The telephone call thus functions not only as the prop for a meditation on the ontological and phenomenological effects of telecommunication technology, but also as the basis for a meditation on the voice as such, and on the voice as an index of mortality. Without the evidence of vision ("sans voir celle qui me parlait de loin") the voice is always already dead. The first voice-that of a loved one on the telephone, whom one cannot see-provokes the hypothesis of a second voice, more radically separated from presence by death, no longer tied to a body ("ne tenant plus à un corps que je ne devais plus jamais revoir"). It is not only, therefore, that one cannot see the body of the voice, nor even that one will never see the body again; the disembodied voice on the telephone opens the possibility of a voice not tied to a body, thus without the real or potential, eventual visual evidence of presence. The acousmatic situation provokes the intimation of a more radical "acousmatisation."
This account can prompt a reminder of two allusions in Barthes's work to the notion of a 'dead' voice. The trope of the voice that clamours from the depths has evident resonance with Valdemar's utterance "I am dead" in Poe's "The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar" (1845), analysed by Barthes in an essay from 1973. 17 The "chthonic" voice, as Barthes puts it, is also present in Barthes's essay on Romantic song, where it appears in the analysis as a marginal yet powerful variant in the allocation of different voices. Voices in the Lieder are not allocated according to the structure of the Oedipal family as they are in opera, according to Barthes, but between the two poles of the human and the diabolical; if the human voice supports the fantasy of a unified body, the diabolical or demoniacal voice threatens the separation and dismemberment of the body: "ce qui est mis en scène vocalement, c'est l'angoisse de quelque chose qui menace de diviser, de séparer, de dissocier, de dépiécer le corps" ("Chant" 254). We might refer to this mode of the voice as a radical acousmatisation, insofar as Barthes postulates that it is "without place" and without a body: "La voix noire, voix du Mal ou de la Mort, est une voix sans lieu, une voix inoriginée. […] [E]lle ne renvoie plus au corps, qui est éloigné dans une sorte de non-lieu" ("Chant" 254). In Proust's text it seems that the two voices are no longer separated; the voice of the full, unified body ("presence réelle que cette voix si proche") is conjoined with the chthonic voice in the same instance; the one implies the other. For Proust as for Barthes, the banal fact of telephonic distance conjures the spectre of the radically disembodied voice.
Despite this initial intimation of the radical acousmatisation of the voice (the fact that it speaks of "une separation éternelle"), Proust's narrator goes on to reflect on the perceptual shifts provoked by the telephone call in a way that resonates with the Schaefferian shift to "la pure écoute" (Schaeffer 93), comparing face-to-face conversation with the act of acousmatic listening: tout d'un coup j'entendis cette voix que je croyais à tort connaître si bien, car jusque-là, chaque fois que ma grand'mère avait causé avec moi, ce qu'elle me disait, je l'avais toujours suivi sur la partition ouverte de son visage où les yeux tenaient beaucoup de place; mais sa voix elle-même, je l'écoutais aujourd'hui pour la première fois. Et parce que cette voix m'apparaissait changée dans ses proportions dès l'instant qu'elle était un tout, et m'arrivait ainsi seule et sans l'accompagnement des traits de la figure, je découvris combien cette voix était douce; peut-être d'ailleurs ne l'avait-elle jamais été à ce point, car ma grand'mère, me sentant loin et malheureux, croyait pouvoir s'abandonner à l'effusion d'une tendresse que, par "principes" d'éducatrice, elle contenait et cachait d'habitude. Elle était douce, mais aussi comme elle était triste, d'abord à cause de sa douceur même presque décantée, plus que peu de voix humaines ont jamais dû l'être, de toute dureté, de tout élément de résistance aux autres, de tout égoïsme; fragile à force de délicatesse, elle semblait à tout moment prête à se briser, à expirer en un pur flot de larmes, puis l'ayant seule près de moi, vue sans le masque du visage, j'y remarquais, pour la première fois, les chagrins qui l'avaient fêlée au cours de la vie. (Proust 127) Visual and aural figures are cross-referenced here in a complex manner. The narrator realizes that he does not know his grandmother's voice as well as he thought he did, precisely because when speaking to her he had "followed" the voice like a musical score on her face; the reading of a musical score functions as an obstacle to a purer act of listening. Paradoxically, however, the reduction of perception to listening allows the narrator to "see" her voice in a purer sense, without the "mask" of the face. It nevertheless allows the narrator to hear his grandmother's voice, as voice ("sa voix elle-même"), for the first time, since it comes to him as a single totality ("dès l'instant qu'elle était un tout"). What this enables the narrator to hear, specifically, is the "douceur" of his grandmother's voice, a sweetness enabled and allowed by the distance and the relaxation of the "educational" principles the narrator imagines the grandmother to bring to bear in face-to-face conversation. The distance, in other words, dissolves the message (the "education") and amplifies the emotive, affective qualities of the voice. It rids or "decants" the voice of all the resistance and egoism involved in discourse (an extremely Barthesian motif) so as to transform it into something like a pure emotive flow. Proust's acousmatic, then, enables less the analysis of the sound in the form of a pure sonic object, as it does for Schaeffer, than the isolation of the purely emotional, affective content of language. To put this in Barthesian terms, the "grain" of the voice here consists of the indices of affect and specifically of the affect of love, since it is the voice of the grandmother speaking directly to the narrator. It is a voice whose sweetness is so decanted and purified of paranoia that it threatens to "break" and "expire" into a pure flow of tears, as if tears could be synesthetically transformed into an audible continuum. The "écoute réduite" (Schaeffer 270-72) provoked by the telephone call isolates an aspect of language beyond words and syntax, the pure language of the heart. If this last expression seems to tip analytic rigour into the domain of the sentimental, it is perhaps because, as Barthes remarks, the Romantic metaphor of the heart appears to us now as diluted, attenuated ("édulcoré[e]") ("Chant" 255). Yet Barthes seems ready to locate, analytically, such a tendency towards sentimentality in Romantic song, a movement emanating from the heart as "le point extrême du corps intérieur" and manifest as "tout un gonflement de la substance musicale" ("Chant" 255-56). Barthes points to the violent contradictions inherent in the heart and in the movement manifest in the music ("Le 'coeur' romantique est un organe fort […] où, tout à la fois et comme contradictoirement, le désir et la tendresse, la demande d'amour et l'appel de jouissance, se mêlent violemment" ["Chant" 255]), and this also seems to be evident in the contradictory emotions at play in Proust's text. The grandmother's voice is "sweet" ("douce"), but sad ("triste"), and sad because of its purified sweetness, frail because of its delicacy, but also sweet and sad and frail because of the pain that inheres in it. The contradiction here in the narrator's perception of his grandmother's voice might be said to relate to the coincidence of the gift and demand of love and the consciousness of time, that is, of mortality. As often in the Recherche, sensory reduction seems to afford a consciousness of time: what the narrator hears, and hears paradoxically in the manner of a reading of the marks or cracks which time has made in the voice, is the index of the suffering body, the body subject to what, elsewhere, he will call "les intermittences du coeur." 18 Acousmatic listening in Proust enables an attention to time in some sense inscribed in the voice, to the temporality of the body from which it emanates, and thus a consciousness of its finitude.
The narrator's sense of the effect of the separation that now affects his relation to his grandmother, that it prefigures the separation her imminent death will make permanent, fills him, we recall, with an urgent desire to find her and to be with her in Paris, a desperation he allegorizes as Orphic. When, a few pages further on, he returns to Paris to seek his Eurydice, he can only "photograph" her with his eyes; all he can see is the spectral form of his grandmother, and his subjectivity is reduced from that of love to that of the objective witness, the photographer (Le côté de Guermantes 132). What is significant for my purposes here is not so much the introduction of the other technology of photography as the agent of alienation and dislocation, as the fact that this agency is preceded by the acousmatic scenario. The separation effected in the acousmatic is prior to that of the virtual image, in terms of narrative sequence, but also in terms of the order, so to speak, of the object, of the psychic and affective relation to the object. But a more powerful point can be drawn here by indicating that the initial acousmatic separation is not resolved by a subsequent visual apprehension. The telephone call has irredeemably intensified the narrator's love for his grandmother by inviting death into his apprehension of her. There is no désacousmatisation.
Drawing on Michel Chion's account of the acousmatic in La voix au cinéma, which develops Schaeffer's concept in the field of film theory, Mladen Dolar proposes a similar emphasis on the irreducibility of acousmatic separation in his reading of the episode of the grandmother's telephone call:
It is as if the presence has been broken, the acousmatic voice has invoked a presence both more real and irretrievably divided, and finding its missing half, the grandmother in flesh and blood, can only make the divide palpable; the impalpable ghost does not vanish but invades the living, he himself a stranger in the presence of a strange woman. 19 Dolar's notion here of the "palpable divide" suggests the acuity and poignancy of the forms of separation that the acousmatic induces, at least in Proust's account. That the divide becomes palpable means that it is covered neither by the illusions of presence, nor by the conceptual abstractions of theory, but that it emerges as the reality of the human condition suspended between language and the body. What the acousmatic makes palpable, in this account, is the separation of "real" presence (the presence of the Real in Lacanian terms), the finite materiality of flesh, and the infinite persistence of language. It is as if, in the grandmother's telephone call, the two sides of this equation strain against each other almost to breaking point.
The contradiction of having a body and speaking a language is, of course, a fact of life; it is revealed with particular and devastating acuity, however, for the amorous subject, as the example from Proust shows, and as Barthes will propose in the entry titled "Fading" of Fragments d'un discours amoureux, where he writes:
Dans le texte, le fading des voix est une bonne chose; les voix du récit vont, viennent, s'effacent, se chevauchent; on ne sait qui parle; cela parle, c'est tout: plus d'image, rien que du langage. Mais l'autre n'est pas un texte, c'est une image, une et coalescente; si la voix se perd, c'est toute l'image qui s'évanouit (l'amour est monologique, maniaque; le texte est hétérologique, pervers). (Fragments 129) Barthes draws out two relations here-a contrast between the field of the text, which is perverse and plural, and the field of love, in which the subject is maniacally focused on the image of the other as a unified ("coalescent") and single object-and a logic of causation between the regime of the voice and the field of the Image. The Image is the dimension of coalescence and integrity, a totality that the fading of the voice causes to dissolve, as if the Image of the other were supported by the plenitude of the voice. The "figure" of fading is defined here as a withdrawal from contact ("Épreuve douloureuse selon laquelle l'être aimé semble se retirer de tout contact" [Fragments 129]), not as an intentional rejection of the amorous subject, nor to the profit of some other. It suggests the opposite of the "gonflement" of the heart in Romantic song, a "dégonflement" in which affect is drained from the voice and tends towards "[le] neutre ou le blanc de la voix," which is an object of terror insofar as it signals a world without desire, in which desire is dead ("La musique" 247). The fading of the voice of the loved one is devastating because it heralds and induces the disappearance of the Image. As if to reinforce this point, Barthes refers parenthetically to a moment in Proust's Le côté de Guermantes when the grandmother, by now gravely ill, fails to recognize the narrator and looks at him "d'un air étonné, méfiant, scandalisé" (Fragments 129); he will also refer specifically to the episode of the grandmother's telephone call, commenting that "s'angoisser au téléphone: véritable signature de l'amour" (Fragments 132). The anguish of the telephone call is love's true signature because, as Barthes insists, the fading of the other insists in the voice; the voice is its index:
Le fading de l'autre se tient dans sa voix. La voix supporte, donne à lire et pour ainsi dire accomplit l'évanouissement de l'être aimé, car il appartient à la voix de mourir. Ce qui fait la voix, c'est ce qui, en elle, me déchire à force de devoir mourir, comme si elle était tout de suite et ne pouvait être jamais rien d'autre qu'un souvenir. Cet être fantôme de la voix, c'est l'inflexion. L'Inflexion, en quoi se définit toute voix, c'est ce qui est en train de se taire, c'est ce grain sonore qui se désa-grège et s'évanouit. La voix de l'être aimé, je ne la connais jamais que morte, remémorée, rappelée à l'intérieur de ma tête, bien au-delà de l'oreille: voix ténue et cependant monumentale, puisqu'elle est de ces objets qui n'ont d'existence qu'une fois disparues. (Fragments 131) It is because "it belongs to the voice to die," because the voice is that organ through which the mortal body inheres in language, that the dissolution of the loved one is manifest in the voice. It is also because the voice is and can never be anything other than a memory. What then is the voice, in itself? It is something over and above the words, not the message or meaning, but the palpable and yet unlocatable "inflection," the "grain sonore" which is fading, both because it is ordinarily not palpable in itself, and because it emanates from the finite and mortal body. The voice as object is, in Barthes's account, manifest only as an internal memory; it is an object that exists only insofar as it has already vanished. What constitutes the voice as voice is "un être fantôme" that is "palpable yet unlocatable," that exists only insofar as it is phantasmatically conjured as an object of desire.
The acousmatic situation, far from enabling a formal and potentially useful analysis of the "vocal object," so to speak, makes manifest the fact that analysis can only circle around it, always missing its object as the palpable yet unlocatable mark that corporeal singularity leaves in the general system of language, the residue of the "phenomenal loss" referred to by Silverman. Barthes's writing on the voice is symptomatic of this circulation, the variations of his desire, and is valuable to us not as the science or knowledge of its object, but as the affirmation of the truth of its impossibility.
King's College London
Notes
